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在算法深度介入市场运行的数字经济背景下，价格、排序与流量等传统市场信号在“效率提升”与“排他限制”两类竞争解释之间日益趋同，反垄断法以市场表现为基础的判断路径由此面临系统性挑战。从事实可区分性视角出发，滥用市场支配地位行为的识别困境并非源于证据不足，而在于用于判断竞争性质的可观察事实难以稳定支撑规范区分，致使执法机关的识别能力与制度威慑同步弱化。通过明确证明标准、推定结构与制裁配置在不同判断条件下的功能定位，对滥用市场支配地位规制进行制度层面的重构，有助于重塑事实与规范之间的衔接机制，从而为反垄断法在技术高度渗透的竞争环境中维持判断能力与规范效能，提供更具解释力与操作性的分析框架。
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基本信息:
DOI：10.16064/j.cnki.cn34-1003/g0.2026.01.018
中图分类号:D922.294
引用信息:
[1]沈维敏.论市场支配地位滥用规制中的事实可区分性衰减[J].江淮论坛,2026,No.335(01):158-166.DOI:10.16064/j.cnki.cn34-1003/g0.2026.01.018.
基金信息:
上海大学青年英才启航计划“算法时代滥用市场支配地位行为的反垄断法规制研究”(N.13-G210-25-293)
2026-01-20
2026-01-20